We provide here a diagnostic of migration of Bangladeshi workers to foreign countries. We show that migration is an important contributor to the economy of Bangladesh and to the welfare of migrants, largely male workers from poor rural households. Based on high intensity recall data, we evidence, however, that migration failures may be as high as one third of attempts at migrating, with large financial losses for households with a failed migrant. The main causes of failure appear to be abuse by fraudulent agents and financial constraints. Failed migrants tend to have lesser support from community migrant networks and to be from more rural environments. Providing assistance to candidates to migration could thus be a major welfare enhancing initiative.
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I. The challenge of migration
International migration plays an important role in the Bangladeshi economy. Official figures indicate that more than $14 billion was remitted by migrants in 2012.
1 This dwarfs the total amount of foreign aid or foreign direct investment the country received, which stood at approximately $2 billion and $1.3 billion respectively. 2 Remittances come only as second to garment exports that reached $20 billion in 2012. While females constitute the majority of workers in the garment sector, migration is dominated by males. Estimates indicate that around 10% of the male labor force is currently migrant, with 0.6 million new migrants each year, contributing more than 12% of GDP. Migration has thus become a major lifeblood to the country's economy. Moreover, with an increasing migration rate, remittances are expected to play an even more prominent role in the future.
At the micro level the impact of migration has been substantial as well. In spite of a remarkably rapid decline in the fertility rate (Paul, 1997) , Bangladesh is a country still with a high labor force growth rate (the total fertility rate was 4.0 for the generation of workers currently entering the labor force) 3 and extensive surplus labor, especially among young unskilled male workers. For them, in spite of cost and risks, migration offers a unique opportunity to escape unemployment and poverty. Most migrants are poor rural low-skilled workers who work on short-term contracts in the Persian Gulf. When successful, migration has been an avenue for poverty reduction for rural households. Families with migrant workers gain from migration through significantly increased levels of income and expenditure. A study by Afsar et al. (2002) estimated that 21 percent of migrant households were moderately poor prior to overseas migration. In the post-migration period, the percentage of poor among these migrant households was reduced to 7 percent. In a benefit-cost analysis of migration, the same study found a ratio of 2.9. Further work by Sharma et al. (2009) showed that overseas migration conveyed substantial benefits to families as measured by household consumption, use of modern agricultural inputs, and level of household savings. In the 2009 Bangladesh Household
Remittances Survey (BHRS), the most comprehensive source of information on migrants so far, migrant households were found to be earning annually twice as much as the average resident 1 http://www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/stattisticalDataAction 2 http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/econdata/index.php 3 http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/Census2011/Bangladesh_glance.pdf 3 household in Bangladesh. Since migration occurs through short-term contracts, there is a general concern that benefits accrued might only be temporary. However, evidence indicates that individuals who have successfully migrated once manage to re-migrate with relative ease.
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Migrants are therefore likely to reap benefits for extended periods of time. In BHRS, 88% of households with migrants reported enhanced educational opportunities for their children, resulting in permanent investments in human capital. In the same survey, 70% of respondents expressed confidence in sustaining the increase in income in the post-migration period through the skills learned and assets acquired through the migration experience. Evidence thus seems to indicate that migration leaves a lasting impact on the income and welfare of migrant households. This is for successful migrants. The other side of the medal, however, vastly ignored and undocumented, is the large rate of migration failure, leaving poor potential migrants generally worse-off after they have invested in migration and failed to succeed. Migration thus appears as a risky enterprise. While it can be highly beneficial for successful migrants, it also leaves others worse off as they have invested in migration while deriving no benefits as the attempt failed.
Given the high expense of the process of long distance migration for very poor households, failure in migrating after the initial investment has been made can have disastrous welfare consequences on the potential migrant's household. A study by the International Organization for Migration (2002) notes that newspapers in Bangladesh report extensively on the plight of failed migrants stemming from such events as malpractice by dishonest middlemen, issuance of fake visas, and arbitrary visa cancelations in the hosting country. Fraudulent agents appear to be particularly active in the migration business where they find a poor and ill-informed clientele. Even though individual cases of migration failure receive widespread coverage in the media, systematic empirical evidence on the issue remains scarce.
BRAC (2007) conducted a pioneering study of migration from Bangladesh, with clear identification of the issue of migration failures and the sources of failure. The database on migration failures in that survey was however very limited, and information more in the nature of case studies. Our study attempts to fill the gap in providing a quantitative documentation on migration failure in Bangladesh. Through a unique data collection strategy using high frequency recalls to characterize attempts at migration (with both successes and failures) and migration 4 itself (including early returns that indicate migration failures), we provide a diagnostic assessment of the extent of migration failure, its cost on failing households, and its possible causes.
While little information is available on migration failure, the role of risk in migration (i.e., the risk of migration failure in holding back migration) has been noted in the literature. Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2011) use a randomized control trial in Bangladesh to show that a small cash incentive to rural households close to subsistence can induce a large response in seasonal rural-urban migration, with high rewards for the household. They attribute this effect to the fact that the risk of not matching to an employer once migrated was holding back the very poor from migrating. Risk reduction through migration financing thus helps poor households take advantage of the benefits of migration. Much attention has also been given to the role of social networks in facilitating migration (Massey and Garcia Espana, 1987) . While social networks have many facilitating functions, their role in reducing migration failures has been emphasized. Finally, while few studies have emphasized migration failures before departing, several studies have emphasized the high chance of failure after migrating, including the risk of falling victim to human trafficking and forced labor (see ILO, 2013) . In our study, we characterize migration failure after departure by early returns (before six months after the departure date). We show, however, that the incidence of migration failure after departure is much less important than the incidence of migration failure before departing, but after funds have been committed to migration. determine the degree of success at migrating using a duration model. The main correlates of success are in this case the size of the community migration network and urban residence.
We describe in Section II how the data were collected. We provide in Section III an estimation of the extent of migration failure and in Section IV of the cost of failure. We then use econometric analysis in Section V to identify the proximate causes of both failure and success in migration.
Section VI asks whether fraud may deter migration, and Section VII concludes with policy recommendations to help candidates to migration achieve a higher rate of success.
II. Data
The data used in this paper were collected in to 50 years of age. A stratified sample of 10 households was then selected from the census for each village so as to obtain a strong representation of households with migrants and with members that attempted but failed to migrate. These households filled a survey with extensive information on their migration experience. The sample for the survey consisted in 4,960
households with information on all adults 15 to 50 years of age.
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The census gives a complete picture of the intensity of migration in each village, but few characteristics on the households or the migrants. In contrast, the survey allows for a detailed characterization of the migration experiences. All the analyses done with the household survey use sampling weights.
III. Migration and migration failure counts from the village censuses
The censuses contain recall data over three years on a total of 143,164 individuals. They provide information on household members and their "status" with regard to migration. For each of the 35 months recorded on the census (from June 2010 to April 2013), individuals are registered as "migrant" if they are abroad, "trying to migrate" if they are engaged in and have committed financial resources to the process of migration, "failed migrant" if they are stopping their quest after having committed some resources, or "resident" if neither of the above. Thus, in effect, the data allow us to establish the migration status of each individual in any particular month over this three-year period. This rich dataset enables us to identify the number of migrants, old migrants, new migrants, failed migrants, and residents based on the status they reported over the three year period. We define six categories of individuals as follows:
Migrant: An individual is categorized as migrant if he/she reported the status of "migrant" at any point in each of the 35 months recorded in the census.
Old migrant: Old migrants are individuals who first migrated before the beginning of the recall data, i.e., before June 2010. They are identified as those whose status is "migrant" on the first month (June 2010) of the census. This is a subset of all migrants.
New Migrant: New migrants are individuals who migrated for the first time over the last three years, i.e., migrating after June 2010 and having never migrated before. Since this is not directly reported in the data, new migrants are identified as being "residents" on the first month (June 2010) of the census and reporting the status of "migrant" in subsequent months. This may lead to an over-count of new migrations as older migrants who were visiting home on June 2010, and are thus recorded as "resident" on that month, will also count as new migrants. We identify these potential re-migrants as being residents in June 2010, but migrating within the next 6 months, and this without having a period of "trying to migrate". This is because when we look at the subset of older migrants, almost none of them in our census reported "trying to migrate" when 7 visiting back home or re-migrating, and migrants that we clearly identify as visiting home stay between 2 to 6 months (only 5% stay more than 6 months). destination. An expanded measure of failure is thus defined as including very short migration durations (less than 6 months), i.e., individuals whose status is reported as "migrant" for a short duration. Using the above definitions of new migrant and failed migrant, we find evidence that a large share of migration attempts result in failure. Our most conservative estimate suggests a migration failure rate of at least 28.4% among new migrants. If we account for discouraged attempts and define short duration migrations as failures, the rate increases to 33.6% and 34.6%, respectively, suggesting that more than 1 in 3 migration attempts are unsuccessful during these 3 years of observation. In contrast, we expect a much lower failure rate among attempts at remigrating by old migrants. Defining re-migration for an older migrant is not without ambiguity.
Many of the 2,331 events that we observe are migrants who return abroad after visiting their family, without loss of visa and/or job at their destinations. The lower bound failure rate calculated on that population is very low, at 0.39%. On the other hand, if one considers only cases where the migrant registers a period of "trying to migrate" before actually migrating, we may be under-counting true re-migration. The corresponding upper bound for the migration failure rate is 15.5%. Even this upper bound is less than half the failure rate of new migrants. This is not surprising as many may have kept their contact at the point of destination, or simply because they know their way through the system.
IV. The cost of migration failure
Due to administrative procedures and distance, the cost of migration to the Persian Gulf countries is extremely high, especially in relation to the domestic incomes of candidates to 9 migration. It is also highly risky as costs must be incurred as an upfront investment before success in migration is secured. The average cost of financing migration currently stands at $2,600 to $3,900, which amounts to three years' worth of income for the average Bangladeshi.
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60% of this cost goes to middlemen (informal agents) and recruiting agencies as commissions for facilitating the migration process. The rest is spent on airfare, passport, visa, medical certificate, and other expenses. Initially the migration agencies used to receive commissions from overseas employers. The expense for the airplane ticket was typically borne by the employer. Now, due to increased international competition and dishonest intermediaries, these charges are borne by the migrant. This has become a major hurdle to migration, and a high source of risk if migration fails given the poverty level of potential migrant households. For this reason, the government has taken initiatives to cut the role of middlemen and recruiting agencies and to directly operate as the agent for migrants. BOESL -a government recruitment agency -has been set up for this purpose. However it has so far met with limited coverage and modest success.
We use the household survey data to quantify the cost of migration failure and examine the possible factors associated with migration failure. In our data, the average household spent Figure 1 . Around 30% of failed migrants invested more than $1,000 in the pursuit of migration.
On the behavioral side, the cost of migration failure appears to be discouragement in trying to migrate again. A large share of failed migrants stop "trying to migrate" altogether once migration failure has occurred. These potential migrants are thus seemingly deprived of the future benefit of migration, at least for some time. As shown on Figure 2 that tracks the proportion of potential migrants remaining residents by month after a migration failure, approximately 80% make no further attempt at migrating in the following three years. Only 5% of potential migrants do not stop trying to migrate following a failure, and another 15% start trying to migrate again over the following three years. This could be due to the large monetary 10 loss and failed migrants might very well try migrating again after 3 years. But given that the median cost of failure stands at only 10% of the total cost of migration, some risk aversion might be involved. Estimating a duration model shows that there is no evidence that the time potential migrants remain residents after a failure is related to their age, education, household size, or land ownership.
We observe a differentially high rate of unemployment among people "still trying" to migrate in 2013 (significantly different at 1% from that of failed migrants and at 5% from that of discouraged). Unemployment is 2.4% among residents, but 15.4% among those still trying to migrate. This suggests that hardship (push factors) may be a powerful incentive for failed migrants to keep on trying.
V. The proximate causes of migration failure and success
Evidence from the survey suggests that informational constraints are one of the primary factors contributing to migration failure, leaving potential migrants vulnerable to fraudulent middlemen. Migrants are mainly rural low-skilled laborers with little education, and often devoid of knowledge of the migration process. In the absence of friends and neighbors who are migrants and experienced with the process, their sole source of information becomes the middlemen, thereby exposing them to higher risk of fraud. When asked to list the primary cause of migration failure, more than half of unsuccessful migrants report fraudulent agents or visa scams as the main causes (Table 3) . The other reasons mentioned as main causes of failure are financial difficulties (20.1%), family or medical problems (19.2%), and failure to obtain a visa (8.7%).
Among individuals still trying to migrate, the main difficulties are both lack of information and difficulty with the paperwork involved (57%) and financial constraints (57%) ( Table 3 ).
Exposure to fraudulent agents (only reported in 3% of the cases)
is not yet revealed as individuals are still trying to migrate.
Prominence of the importance of informational constraints is evidenced by existence of a strong negative correlation between the failure rate and the total number of migrants in the village, suggesting that a strong community-based migrant network contributes to reducing migration failure. The more migrants a village has abroad, the less the chance of failure for 11 potential new migrants. A non-parametric estimated curve indicates that the failure rate declines from more than 20 percent to around 5 percent as the number of migrants per village increases from 0 to 60. Migration is thus an accelerating process whereby more migrants facilitate more migration. Successful migrants have on average 35 other migrants in the village compared to 23 for failed migrants. Other revealing contrasts between new and failed migrants suggest the importance of education. New migrants also have higher savings, but this is already partially endogenous to the migration outcome.
As indicated in Table 3 , a fifth of failed migrants report financial constraints as the main cause for failure. After fraudulent agents and fake visas, this is the next most important cause of migration failure. A large share of migrants report that they finance the cost of migration by borrowing money from friends and family, while others finance it through selling or mortgaging land, selling assets such as livestock, and drawing down their savings (see information from case studies of migrants in Akram, 2007) . For those who lack sufficient wealth or access to wealthy lenders, difficulty of accessing credit can be a major barrier.
A significant factor contributing to failure is weak demand for migrants at the international level. Migration from Bangladesh is exogenously determined at the level of individual candidates to migration, based on deals and manpower contracts signed by the Bangladeshi government with other nations. Using data from Bangladesh Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), the official bureau in charge of migration, we find a significant increase in failure rate in periods of low national migration as shown in Figure 3 . Intermediaries typically require money in advance for managing migration. In the face of weak demand, they have a higher likelihood of failing to place their clients abroad and opt to renege on contracts.
Another way of analyzing the difficulty to migrate is to consider the time it takes to those that try to migrate to eventually succeed. Considering all men that attempted to migrate for the first time at some point over the three years of observation, Figure 4 reports their cumulative success rate over time. Only 25% of those trying to migrate have succeeded in migrating in six months, 50% in a year, and after 36 months 40 % have failed to achieve their goal and are still trying.
In Table 4 , we estimate a duration model of migration success. This analysis does not distinguish between the different forms of failure mentioned above, as they all fall under nonsuccess, but it allows to use all the available information, even from recent entry into the migration process, in order to determine the proximate causes of success or non-success and to include varying circumstances such as evolution of the migration network size or the national context for migration. The key determinants of interest are the aggregate migration context and the social network -where social network is characterized by the total migration per village (community network) and the number of migrant relatives for each individual (kinship network), and aggregate migration is the flow of national migration in the corresponding month. The estimate reported in Column 1 indicates that aggregate departures significantly affect the individual probability of success in migration. Results in Column 2 show that availability of a community network is significantly correlated with a lower risk of migration failure. Having one more migrant in your village increases the probability to successfully migrate in a given month by 1.5%. Having one more member of your family abroad increase the probability of success by 3.8%, although this effect is not statistically significant because of a very large standard error.
These effects are large: a one standard deviation of the cross-section distribution of the village network size, equal to 16.2 migrants, is associated with a 25% difference in the chance of success. Similarly, national migration also exerts a significant impact on the probability of success, with a one standard deviation decrease in monthly migration countrywide associated with a 20% lower chance of success at the individual level. These results are robust to controlling for total land owned by the household, housing conditions, age, education, rural/urban residence, and whether the individual has received training through a publicly available government program (column 3). Among other factors effecting success, participation to training programs provided by either private or government recruiting agencies appears to be important.
VI. Will fraud deter migration?
Is the probability of failure in migration a deterrent in trying to migrate? In a Harris and Todaro (1970) perspective, the decision to migrate is given by the wage in Bangladesh (W B ), the wage in the Gulf countries (W G ), the cost of migration (C), and the likelihood of success in migration (P). Migration will continue for as long as there is a positive expected gain from migration, namely if:
We take the wage of construction workers in Bangladesh and the destination countries. There is a large gap in construction worker wages in the Gulf countries between resident and migrant workers. In the United Arab Emirates, for instance, survey data show that the wage of resident workers is almost five times larger than for migrant workers. The cost of migration to the Gulf is on average $3250. With a two-year contract, the cost of migration is thus $135/mo. We can calculate the Harris-Todaro threshold using the following figures for Malaysia in 2012 derived from the survey:
Probability of success in migration: 2/3 (from Table 2 We thus see that there is still a large expected gain from migration. If left unchecked, fraudulent agents can still extract large rents from potential migrants before deterring attempts at migrating. Market equilibrium will not deter fraud for a long time, even though it robs migrants in expected value from 37% of the gains from a safe migration. Protection of migrants against rent extraction has to come from government regulation of the migration agencies or from NGO support in informing migrants and exposing fraud.
VII. Conclusion
International migration in search of employment is a costly and risky enterprise. When potential migrants are poor, migration failure not only robs households from a unique opportunity to move out of poverty, but also will push them further into poverty. We studied migration failure in the context of attempts by mainly young unskilled Bangladeshi male workers at migrating to the Gulf Countries. Some attention has been given in the literature to the impact of risk on the decision to migrate and to migration failure once in the country of destination. By contrast, little attention has been given to failure in successfully leaving the country when eventually large expenditures have already been incurred toward migrating. We use a unique data collection strategy to characterize migration and migration failure, combining village censuses with household surveys with high intensity recalls of migration status over the last three years. We
show that up to 34% of potential migrants fail to migrate and that the average monetary loss exceeds $818. Failure to leave the country is much larger than failure once migrated. The main 14 causes of failure to leave are abuse by fraudulent agents made easy by lack of information for candidates to migration, and financial constraints. 
